Standard of Appellate Review of Rule 11 Decisions by Greco, Louis
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 58 Issue 2 Article 5 
1989 
Standard of Appellate Review of Rule 11 Decisions 
Louis Greco 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Louis Greco, Standard of Appellate Review of Rule 11 Decisions, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 251 (1989). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
OF RULE 11 DECISIONS
INTRODUCTION
Congress amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
("Rule 1 1")I in 1983 as part of an effort to encourage the use of sanctions
to prevent delay and expense caused by inappropriate litigation tactics.2
Rule 11 litigation has increased significantly since that time.' Commen-
tators predicted that the Rule would be applied inconsistently in early
cases, but expressed the hope that the courts of appeals would eventually
develop coherent standards to guide district courts in its use.' Although
Rule 11 cases have become common since 1983, district courts still do
not apply the Rule uniformly.'
Appellate courts are forced to balance several competing policy con-
siderations in order to arrive at an appropriate standard of review for the
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 provides in relevant part that:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney .... A party who is not represented by
an attorney shall sign the party's pleading, motion, or other paper .... The
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the
signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after
the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a repre-
sented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reason-
able attorney's fee.
Id.
2. See Excerpt From the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983). The use of sanctions to
deter abuse was a common theme throughout the proposed amendments to Rule 11, Rule
16 and Rule 26. For example, Rule 16(f) now authorizes sanctions for lack of prepared-
ness at scheduling and pre-trial conferences. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, advisory committee's
note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 213 (1983). Delay and expense caused by improper
discovery requests and responses are now expressly sanctionable under Rule 26(g). See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.
3. See Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 199 (1988).
4. See Vairo, supra note 3, at 202; Remarks of Professor Arthur Miller, Judicial
Conference-Second Circuit, 101 F.R.D. 161, 198 (1983) [hereinafter Miller Remarks].
5. See Vairo, supra, note 3, at 202; see also Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836
F.2d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc) ("Rule 11 decisions by courts have not always
been consistent, producing confusion among the bench and bar, as well as inequitable
results."); Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1541 (9th Cir.
1986) (even in fairly routine cases, "there is a good deal of interjudge disagreement over
what actions constitute a violation of the rule") (quoting S. Kassin, An Empirical Study
of Rule 11 Sanctions xi (Federal Judicial Center 1985)).
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Rule 11 decisions of district courts. For example, appellate courts can
promote uniformity in district court decisions by engaging in a meticu-
lous, point-by-point examination of the lower court's ruling.6 Such a re-
view, however, could represent an extravagant use of the resources of
appellate courts. The propriety of a time-consuming review of Rule 11,
decisions is questionable in view of the Rule's mandate to streamline ju-
dicial procedures.
Appellate courts must also realize that the standard of review they
choose for Rule 11 cases could influence the outcome of appeals. More
scrupulous and detailed examination of Rule 11 decisions would likely
uncover more grounds for reversal than would less thorough review.7
Finally, appellate courts must balance Rule 1 l's policy of discouraging
and punishing frivolous claims against the benefits to the judicial system
of innovative legal theories.8 Because the district court makes the origi-
nal determination of whether a strategy represents an innovation or a
Rule 11 violation, the appellate court's standard of review affects the
amount of control district courts have over the creativity of litigators.
In response to the tensions between these policies, appellate courts
have settled on three different standards for reviewing the Rule 11 deci-
sions of district courts. One group of courts employs a three-part stan-
dard of review of Rule 11 decisions.9 These courts review disputed
factual determinations by applying the clearly erroneous standard. The
legal conclusion whether the Rule has been violated, however, is re-
viewed de novo. Finally, these courts review the amount and type of
sanction imposed by applying an abuse of discretion standard.I° A sec-
ond group of courts has adopted the approach employed by the Court of
6. Scrupulous appellate review in early cases was probably an attempt by the circuit
courts to define Rule 11 standards to govern future litigation. See T.E. Willging, The
Rule 11 Sanctioning Process 108 (Federal Judicial Center 1989) (lengthy appellate deci-
sions consistent with "shakeout period" to develop standards). One author has noted
that courts advocating de novo review are probably trying to promote uniformity in the
imposition of sanctions, "but the goal of uniformity may be no better served by the de
novo standard because many sanctions cases are fact-intensive, close calls." C. Shaffer,
Jr. & P. Sandier, Sanctions: Rule 11 and Other Powers 28 (2d ed. 1988) (citations
omitted).
7. Cf J. Friedenthal, M. Kane, & A. Miller, Civil Procedure § 13.4, at 597-98 (1985)
(likelihood of reversal depends on standard used to determine whether trial court erred).
8. The Advisory Committee cautioned against stifling legal creativity. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11, advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983); see also
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Vital
changes have been wrought by those members of the bar who have dared to challenge the
received wisdom, and a rule that penalized such innovation and industry would run
counter to our notions of the common law itself."), modified on other grounds, 821 F.2d
121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987). But see Miller Remarks, supra note 4, at
200 (concern may be overemphasized); Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1013, 1018 (1988) (no evidence of Rule's chilling effect).
9. See, e.g., Ahern v. Central Pac. Freight Lines, 846 F.2d 47, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1988);
Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Kurkowski v.
Volcker, 819 F.2d 201, 203 n.8 (8th Cir. 1987) (adopting the Zaldivar standard).
10. See Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 828; infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Westmoreland v. CBS. 1
These courts hold that the type of violation that is alleged determines
whether the appellate court should apply the abuse of discretion standard
or review the district court decision de novo. 2 A third group of courts
uses an abuse of discretion standard to review all aspects of the
decision.13
This Note will consider which standard of review best balances the
competing policies surrounding application of Rule 11. A uniform stan-
dard of review among the circuit courts, as well as within each circuit, 4
will promote consistency in Rule 11 appellate decisions and provide liti-
gants with a better basis on which to decide whether to appeal district
court decisions. 5 Part I of this Note discusses the background of the
Rule 11 amendment and the policy behind the amendment. Part II sets
forth the standards that appellate courts have used when reviewing Rule
11 decisions. Part III argues that the competing goals of Rule 11 are best
served by a modified abuse of discretion standard that calls for stricter
scrutiny of the imposition of sanctions than of the denial of such
penalties.
I. THE AMENDED RULE 11
Congress modified Rule 1116 as part of a package of amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure designed to reduce litigation abuse
11. 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
12. See id. at 1174-75; City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 844 F.2d 42, 49-50 (2d
Cir. 1988); Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987); infra notes 39-46
and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. Tekfen Constr. & Installation Co., 847 F.2d 440, 443 (7th
Cir. 1988); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 872-73 (5th Cir. 1988) (en
banc); infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
14. For examples of intracircuit confusion on what standard of review applies to Rule
11 decisions, see generally, Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928,
930 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Thomas, 836 F.2d at 871-73.
15. Cf. J. Friedenthal, M. Kane, & A. Miller, supra note 7, at 597 ("decision to take
an appeal is influenced . . . by considerations relating to . . . standards involving the
nature and scope of review").
16. The first version of Rule 11, enacted in 1938, provided in part that:
[t]he signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading
is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be
stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading
had not been served. For a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be
subjected to appropriate disciplinary action.
28 U.S.C. app. § 540, 540-41 (1982). The original Rule was ineffective in deterring litiga-
tion abuses. Under the original Rule 11, only willful violations could be sanctioned.
Therefore, an attorney who was merely negligent or incompetent did not violate the Rule.
In addition, the courts differed as to whether a party could be sanctioned for a violation
by his attorney. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D.
165, 198 (1983). Courts were reluctant to invoke the Rule because the imposition of
"disciplinary action" was discretionary. See id. For a discussion of fee-shifting under the
old Rule 11, see Vairo, supra note 3, at 191 n.8; see also Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the
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and to reform pretrial procedures.17 Recognizing that more than 90 per-
cent of cases never reach trial, the Advisory Committee on Federal Civil
Rules realized that the best way to address the "litigation crunch" was to
focus on the rules that govern pretrial procedure."8 The principal objec-
tive was to increase the involvement of district courts in the management
and control of litigation. 9 In particular, the Advisory Committee hoped
that Rule 11 would streamline litigation by discouraging frivolous claims
and defenses.2'
The Advisory Committee revised the Rule to impose a more demand-
ing, objective standard of reasonableness upon attorneys.21 The new
standard specifies what an attorney must do before filing a pleading, mo-
tion or other paper.22 An attorney's signature now certifies that he has
read the document; he has made a reasonable inquiry into the facts; he
has made a reasonable inquiry into the law; the document is well-
grounded in fact; the document is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law; and that the document has not been interposed for any improper
purpose. 2' The Advisory Committee also strengthened Rule 11 by re-
New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 183 (1985) (discussing reluctance
of judges to sanction attorneys).
17. See supra note 2.
18. See Miller Remarks, supra note 4, at 198.
19. See Vairo, supra note 3, at 190; supra note 17 and accompanying text.
20. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee's'note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198
(1983). However, one commentator has remarked that "more and 'better' rules may not
be the answer. Rules require sanctions. Sanctions require enforcement proceedings.
These absorb resources of time, energy, and money that it is the very purpose of the rules
to spare." Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules After Halfa Century, 36 Me. L. Rev. 243,
244 (1984).
21. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198
(1983) ("The standard is one of reasonableness under the circumstances."); Eastway Con-
str. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[S]ubjective good faith
no longer provides the safe harbor it once did."), modified on other grounds, 821 F.2d 121
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
22. This objective standard increases the scope of abuses covered by Rule 11. The
Rule now effectively provides for the sanctioning of abuse caused not only by bad faith
but by negligence and to some extent, by professional incompetence. See Hays v. Sony
Corp. of America, 847 F.2d 412, 418-19 (7th Cir. 1988); Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835
F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1987).
23. One commentator has referred to it as a "five-fold certification":
An attorney's signature now constitutes a five-fold certification that an attorney
or party: [1] has read the [document]; [2] that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry; [3] it is well grounded in
fact and [4] is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of existing law, and [5] that it is not interposed
for any improper purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation.
Vairo, supra note 3, at 194. The reasonable inquiry requirement can be further split into
two parts: reasonable inquiry into the facts and reasonable inquiry into the law. See
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Rule
requires reasonable inquiry into facts, reasonable inquiry into law, and proper purpose
for interposition of all documents).
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quiring that all violations be sanctioned.24
In addition, the new Rule authorizes the award of costs and attorneys'
fees to deter attorneys from filing papers that are frivolous or motivated
by a purpose other than legitimate advocacy.2" This authorization, how-
ever, was not intended to turn the Rule into a wholesale fee-shifting de-
vice; the Rule's primary objective remains the deterrence of litigation
abuses.2
6
The circuit courts have emphasized the role of the amendments to the
Rule, as well as the policy concerns behind them, in deciding which stan-
dard of review should be utilized.27
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW APPLIED IN RULE 11 CASES
Rule 11 requires a court finding a violation to impose "an appropriate
sanction. '28 The Advisory Committee gave the district court discretion
to choose how best to sanction violations. 29 Accordingly, all appellate
courts apply the abuse of discretion standard3" when reviewing the
24. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 200
(1983) (stressing necessity of sanctions to secure system's effective operation). Members
of the Advisory Committee feared that the proposed Rule would not be used enough,
notwithstanding the new objective standard, the explicit authorization of costs and the
mandate that all violations be punished. Many other members feared, however, that par-
ties would invoke the new Rule too often. The Advisory Committee acknowledged this
possibility but believed that, although lawyers might be carried away for a time, the man-
agement efficiencies of the district courts would overcome any temporary litigation bur-
den. See Miller Remarks, supra note 4, at 200.
The first fear has proven to be groundless, although the second may have been realized.
See Vairo, supra note 3, at 195; see also Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,
801 F.2d 1531, 1541 (9th Cir. 1986):
Litigation on the issue of sanctions, like any litigation, is expensive.... It is not
unusual for lawyers involved in sanction proceedings to hire other lawyers to
represent them .... Litigation expenses [in this case] already must have ex-
ceeded, many times over, the few thousand dollars of sanctions imposed.
Id.
25. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198
(1983); Schwarzer, supra note 16, at 184-85. Other changes, not relevant to the discus-
sion of appellate review, include: 1) the ability to sanction the party, the attorney, or
both, whereas the original Rule could be invoked only against the attorney; 2) the appli-
cability to all signed papers, not only pleadings; and 3) the court's ability to raise the issue
sua sponte. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165,
198-200 (1983).
26. See Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1987) (goal of Rule 11 is
deterrence, not wholesale fee-shifting).
27. See infra notes 28-46 and accompanying text.
28. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
29. The Advisory Committee's note states that "[t]he court, however, retains the nec-
essary flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of the rule. It has discretion to
tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case, with which it should be well ac-
quainted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee's note, reprinted at 97 F.R.D. 165, 200
(1983). The Advisory Committee provided no specific guidelines for tailoring a sanction
but did suggest that a court give some consideration to whether a party is proceeding pro
se and whether the violation is willful. See id.
30. See J. Friedenthal, M. Kane, & A. Miller, supra note 7, at 605 (appellate court
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amount and type of sanctions.31 Courts have disagreed, however, about
the standard of review to be applied to other Rule 11 issues.32
A. The Tripartite Standard
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Zaldivar v. City of Los
Angeles,33 was the first to employ a tripartite standard. This standard
requires that courts review disputed factual determinations under the
clearly erroneous standard.34 De novo review is used to test the legal
conclusion that the Rule was or was not violated. Finally, courts over-
turn the amount and type of sanction imposed only upon finding an
abuse of discretion.35
Other courts have adopted the Zaldivar standard, reasoning that "[a]
will reverse discretionary decision only if court below was clearly wrong); see also
Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Emory L.J. 747, 763 (1982) (there are many
definitions of "abuse of discretion," ranging from ones requiring extreme deference to
others differing from error by only slightest nuance).
31. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874 (5th Cir. 1988) (en
banc) (court reviews amount of sanction under abuse of discretion standard); Zaldivar v.
City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986) (court uses abuse of discretion
standard to review amount of sanction); Westmoreland v. CBS, 770 F.2d 1168, 1174
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (employing abuse of discretion standard to review amount of sanction).
32. See infra notes 33-55 and accompanying text.
33. 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986). The court held that:
Appellate review of orders imposing sanctions under Rule 11 may require a
number of separate inquiries. If the facts relied upon by the district court to
establish a violation of the Rule are disputed on appeal, we review the factual
determinations of the district court under a clearly erroneous standard. If the
legal conclusion of the district court that the facts constitute a violation of the
rule is disputed, we review that legal conclusion de novo. Finally, if the appro-
priateness of the sanction imposed is challenged, we review the sanction under
an abuse of discretion standard.
Id. at 828 (emphasis in original).
34. The Supreme Court defined a finding as "clearly erroneous" when "although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
35. The Ninth Circuit adopted the tripartite standard to maintain consistency with its
standard of review of discovery sanctions and sanctions under various statutes. See
Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 828 n.4. Several of these authorities leave the imposition of sanc-
tions to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) (any attorney
who unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies proceedings may be required to satisfy ex-
cess costs, expenses and attorney's fees) (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (court
may, at its discretion, award attorney's fees in civil rights litigation).
In fact, this tripartite standard conforms with appellate review in general. Appellate
courts should not overturn factual determinations unless they are "clearly erroneous."
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52. Legal questions are reviewed de novo. See Century Products,
Inc. v. Sutter, 837 F.2d 247, 253 (6th Cir., 1988) (Nelson, J. concurring); J. Friedenthal,
M. Kane, & A. Miller, supra note 7, § 13.4, at 600 ("The fullest scope of review, not
surprisingly, is for errors of law; the appellate court will decide questions of law de
novo."). Few courts will allow a permissible conclusion of law when another is more
correct. "However, an implicit tendency to affirm and the fact that the lower court has
considered the legal point may add up to practical deference in some cases." 1 S. Chil-
dress & M. Davis, Standards of Review 78 (1986).
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natural concomitant of a mandatory imposition of sanctions is a broad-
ened scope of review by the Court of Appeals."36 These courts conclude
that an appellate court is in as good a position as a district court to deter-
mine whether a pleading violated Rule 11 and, therefore, need not defer
to the lower court's judgment.37
The tripartite standard dictates more thorough review than the other
standards. More thorough review better ensures due process 38 to a sanc-
tioned attorney and provides for a greater appellate curb on the possible
district court stifling of legal creativity. In addition, because more thor-
ough review increases the chances of finding grounds for reversal, it in-
creases the possibility that a party injured by abusive practices but
improperly denied sanctions will be compensated.39
However, the tripartite standard has shortcomings. The standard's
more thorough review consumes more judicial resources. The standard
is also difficult to apply. This difficulty arises because Rule 11 controver-
sies implicate questions of both fact and law. Because appellate courts
must defer to district courts' factual determinations, while the legal con-
clusions whether the Rule has been violated must be reviewed de novo, a
court applying the tripartite standard must first separate the factual find-
ings from the legal conclusion.
B. The Westmoreland Standard
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Westmoreland v.
CBS,4' held that the type of violation considered on appeal determines
the standard of review. The court determined that the district court
should focus on the objective merits of the pleading.41 Because compli-
ance with the Rule is now judged under an objective standard, courts
applying the Westmoreland standard focus only on the requirements that
the pleading be well-grounded in fact, warranted by existing law and not
interposed for an improper purpose. These courts assume that an objec-
36. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir. 1985),
modified on other grounds, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987);
accord Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1126 (5th Cir. 1987);
Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1434 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1987);
Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. 1986).
37. See Eastway, 762 F.2d at 254 n.7.
38. See Vairo, supra note 3, at 226 (more thorough review of district court grants of
sanctions protects litigants from arbitrary and unfair imposition of sanctions by district
court); cf Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 201
(1983) (sanctions proceedings must comport with due process).
39. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
40. 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
41. The court held that:
[u]nder Rule 11, sanctions may be imposed if a reasonable inquiry discloses the
pleading, motion, or paper is (1) not well grounded in fact, (2) not warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or rever-
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tive inquiry into the merits of the pleading will reveal non-compliance
with any of the other requirements.4 2
Courts that adopt the Westmoreland approach use an abuse of discre-
tion standard to review fact-intensive issues such as whether a pleading,
motion or other paper was well grounded in fact or had been interposed
for an improper purpose. 43 However, the appellate court must review de
novo questions of law such as whether a document was warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument" for the modification, extension or
reversal of existing law.45 Finally, these courts review the amount and
type of sanction imposed under an abuse of discretion standard.46
42. One court limited the analysis to only two critical inquiries: "[A] complaint
which complies with the 'well-grounded in fact and warranted by... law' clause cannot
be sanctioned as harassment under Rule 11, regardless of the subjective intent of the
attorney or litigant." Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531,
1538 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); accord Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc.,
836 F.2d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1987). Most courts, however, retain the "improper pur-
pose" clause, judging its violation by an objective standard. See Brown v. Federation of
Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1436 (7th Cir. 1987); Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d
151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986); Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 n.9 (9th Cir.
1986); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253-54 (2d Cir. 1985),
modified on other grounds, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987);
Schwarzer, supra note 16, at 195-96.
There is some support for the proposition that only the objective merits of the pleading
should be examined. See, e.g., Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 861 F.2d 746, 759
(1st Cir. 1988) (fearing "myriad number of satellite litigations," court refused to entertain
defendant's argument that, although equitable tolling argument was possible, plaintiff
knew of no such argument when complaint was filed); Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 830 ("In
practical effect, an obviously meritorious paper will go unchallenged, whether read or
not."). But see generally Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1013 (1987)
(arguing that focus on merits of litigation clouds issue of attorney misconduct); accord
Beeman v. Fiester, 852 F.2d 206, 211 (7th Cir. 1988) (primary focus is on pre-filing
inquiry).
43. The court added:
In determining whether factual (1) or dilatory or bad faith (3) reasons exist
which may give rise to invocation of Rule 11 sanctions, the district court is
accorded wide discretion. For the district court has tasted the flavor of the
litigation and is in the best position to make these kinds of determinations.
However, once the court finds that these factors exist, Rule 11 requires that
sanctions of some sort be imposed. A refusal to invoke Rule 11 constitutes
error. On the other hand, a decision whether the pleading or motion is legally
sufficient (2) involves a question of law and receives this court's de novo review.
Westmoreland v. CBS, 770 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original).
44. Although the focus in most of these appeals will be on the merits of the legal
arguments in light of existing law, there are some factual components to this determina-
tion. One court has noted that "[t]he only way to find out whether a complaint is an
effort to change the law is to examine with care the arguments counsel later adduce."
Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1082 (7th Cir. 1987); see also In
re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1987) (determination of whether
complaint is good faith argument for extension of existing law involves factual issues
concerning position litigant took). But see Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1085 (Cudahy, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part) (under this approach "rhetoric can salvage almost any
position and avoid sanctions").
45. See Westmoreland, 770 F.2d at 1174-75.
46. See id. at 1174 (Rule's provision that court "shall impose" sanctions concentrates
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Courts that apply the Westmoreland standard47 are forced to consume
more judicial resources when reviewing alleged "warranted by existing
law" violations than courts that apply the abuse of discretion standard.
In addition, a court that applies this standard may find it difficult to
characterize the type of violation alleged. A pleading may be frivolous in
part because of an insufficient factual inquiry and in part due to an im-
plausible legal argument. In such a situation, the appellate court may
have trouble determining whether to characterize the pleading as one
that was not "well-grounded in fact" or one that was not "warranted by
existing law."
C. The Abuse of Discretion Standard
Many other courts use an abuse of discretion standard to review all
aspects of Rule 11 decisions.4" In applying this standard, an appellate
court examines the lower court's factual determinations, its legal conclu-
sion regarding whether the Rule has been violated, and the amount of
any sanction imposed, looking for an abuse of discretion. This standard
is widely accepted because it is easy to apply.4 9 Some courts that apply
this standard also reason that an appellate court cannot achieve a district
court's familiarity with the case and the parties.50 These courts stress
district court's discretion on selection of appropriate sanctions rather than on decision to
impose sanctions).
47. Some courts have misinterpreted this standard as being a variation of the tripar-
tite standard. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit specifically referred to it as:
a variation of the three-tiered analysis espoused in Zaldivar, utilizing an abuse
of discretion standard when reviewing the factual reasons for imposing Rule 11
sanctions and the amount and type of sanctions, while reserving a de novo anal-
ysis for reviewing the legal sufficiency of a pleading or motion and the determi-
nation to impose sanctions.
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 872 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane); see also
Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 861 F.2d 746, 757 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting
Thomas interpretation of Westmoreland standard). The Westmoreland standard, as
quoted by other courts, would appear to differ from the Zaldivar standard only in its
application of an abuse of discretion standard rather than a clearly erroneous standard to
factual determinations. This misinterpretation may be the reason why only one other
circuit has adopted the Westmoreland approach. See Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551,
1556 (11th Cir. 1987).
48. See, e.g., Thomas, 836 F.2d at 872; EBI, Inc. v. Gator Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 1, 6
(1st Cir. 1986); Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1986); Stevens v. Law-
yers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 1056, 1060 (4th Cir. 1986); Lieb v. Topstone Indus.,
Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986).
49. See Kale, 861 F.2d at 758. The Seventh Circuit has also accepted this standard
but has emphasized Rule 52's mandate that factual determinations be undisturbed unless
clearly erroneous. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Therefore, it has been held that while fac-
tual determinations are subject to a clearly erroneous review, the abuse of discretion stan-
dard generally applies to Rule 11 decisions. See F.D.I.C. v. Tekfen Constr. & Installation
Co., 847 F.2d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 1988); In re Ronco, Inc., 838 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir.
1988); Ordower v. Feldman, 826 F.2d 1569, 1574 (7th Cir. 1987).
50. See Kale, 861 F.2d at 758; Mihalik v. Pro Arts, Inc., 851 F.2d 790, 793 (6th Cir.
1988); Thomas, 836 F.2d at 872-73.
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that district courts must have discretion to regulate their dockets" and
that "the district court will have a better grasp of what is acceptable trial-
level practice."52 Courts that use the abuse of discretion standard agree
that the Rule's mandatory language requires that all violations be sanc-
tioned, but unlike courts employing the tripartite standard, do not be-
lieve that the words "shall impose" mandate de novo review.53
Recently, some courts employing the abuse of discretion standard, in-
cluding a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,54 have
suggested that in order to ensure fairness to attorneys who have been
sanctioned, a district court's decision to impose sanctions should be re-
viewed more closely than a denial of sanctions.5 5 In contrast, there is no
need for thorough review of a denial because the unsuccessful movant
has no substantive right to a fee-shifting. 56 More importantly, this ap-
proach conserves appellate resources by discouraging appeals of unsuc-
cessful sanctions motions, which now comprise a large percentage of
Rule 11 appeals.57
51. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 872 (5th Cir. 1988) (en
bane).
52. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 566 (E.D.N.Y.
1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985), modified on other grounds,
821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
53. See O'Connell v. Champion Int'l Corp., 812 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1987) (Rule
requires that all violations be sanctioned but decision whether violation occurred deserves
substantial deference).
54. See Thomas, 836 F.2d at 883.
55. See In re Ronco, Inc., 838 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1988). The court held that:
Review under the abuse of discretion standard does not mean no appellate re-
view. Rule I 1 sanctions have significant impact beyond the merits of the indi-
vidual case. Concerns for the effect on both an attorney's reputation and for the
vigor and creativity of advocacy by other members of the bar necessarily require
that we exercise less than total deference to the district court in its decision to
impose Rule 11 sanctions.
1d; see also Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 883 (5th Cir. 1988) (en
banc) ("If the sanctions imposed are substantial in amount, type, or effect, appellate re-
view of such awards will be inherently more rigorous."); Vairo, supra note 3, at 226
(arguing imposition of sanctions should be reviewed more closely than denial). One com-
mentator has remarked that:
To the extent that the appellate [reversals of district courts' denials of sanctions]
conclude that an argument was frivolous as a matter of law, they appear to be
incompatible with the standards articulated by the circuits for judging frivolity.
In other words, a standard of frivolity that depends on an argument's having
absolutely no chance of success implies giving deference to a trial judge who
finds a chance of success.
T.E. Willging, supra note 6, at 46 (footnote omitted). Judge Friendly characterized the
different definitions of "abuse of discretion" as not only defensible but essential because
the reasons for deference vary. See Friendly, supra note 30, at 764.
56. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
57. As of December 1987, approximately 42% of reported Rule I 1 decisions by the
circuit courts involved appeals of denials and approximately 72% of these were affirmed.
See Vairo, supra note 3, at 234.
RULE 11
III. BALANCING RULE 11 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The abuse of discretion standard best balances the competing policy
considerations of Rule 11. However, the standard should be modified so
that appellate courts review the decision to impose sanctions more
closely than the denial of such penalties.
The abuse of discretion standard gives the district court more control
of the litigation. Such control was one of the goals of the 1983 amend-
ments. 58 Courts advocating an abuse of discretion standard correctly
emphasize that the district court's perspective on what occurred during
the proceedings cannot be duplicated.59 Even the Ninth Circuit, which
first articulated the tripartite standard, has acknowledged that the appel-
late court's perspective is limited.6' In contexts other than Rule 11, the
use of an abuse of discretion standard reflects the appellate court's deci-
sion that the trial judge is in a better position to make a determination
and should be afforded discretion.6' As the district court is in a better
position to make a Rule 11 determination, appellate courts should also
use an abuse of discretion standard to review Rule 11 decisions.
However, to best balance Rule 1l's competing policy considerations,
appellate courts should review the district court decisions which impose
sanctions more closely than those denying sanctions. By so modifying
the standard, appellate courts will better ensure fairness to attorneys and
room for legal creativity, while discouraging appeals of decisions denying
sanctions, thereby limiting proceedings. By limiting the possibility of the
reversal of a decision denying sanctions, litigants will have less incentive
to abuse the Rule by continuing to use it as a fee-shifting device. How-
58. See id. at 190; supra note 19 and accompanying text. Judge Friendly noted that
deference has traditionally been given in other trial management matters such as discov-
ery, continuances, allowing amendments to pleadings and holding pre-trial conferences.
He remarked that:
[a]nother principle supporting deference to rulings of the trial court is the ab-
sence of the benefits that ordinarily flow from appellate review in establishing
rules that will govern future cases. This is true in the frequent situations...
where the factors "are so numerous, variable and subtle that the fashioning of
rigid rules would be more likely to impair [the trial judge's] ability to deal fairly
with a particular problem than to lead to a just result.
See Friendly, supra note 30, at 760 (quoting United States v. McCoy, 517 F.2d 41, 44 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied., 423 U.S. 895 (1975)).
59. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 873 (5th Cir. 1988) (en
banc).
60. See Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 836 F.2d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir. 1987)
("[A]lthough this court reviews de novo whether particular conduct is sanctionable, it is
necessarily handicapped in its review because it is more distant from the parties and
events than the district court.").
61. See J. Friedenthal, M. Kane, & A. Miller, supra note 7, at 605:
[T]his narrow scope of review reflects the desire of the appellate courts not to
intrude on the trial process too readily, particularly when the trial judge may be
in the best position to make the determination involved. Indeed, the decision to
treat certain matters as discretionary indicates that that is the case.
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ever, when the district court does impose sanctions, this modified abuse
of discretion standard will ensure fairness to the sanctioned attorney and
will provide appellate guidance to control the Rule's "chilling effect".
CONCLUSION
An unmodified abuse of discretion standard emphasizes conservation
of judicial resources over the pursuit of compensation, but may be unfair
to an improperly sanctioned attorney and may chill legal creativity. The
tripartite standard, in all appeals of awards, and the Westmoreland stan-
dard, in appeals of district court decisions that a pleading was not war-
ranted by existing law, ensure fairness and room for legal creativity, but
dictate a needlessly extensive review when sanctions have been denied. A
modified abuse of discretion standard that reviews district court imposi-
tions of sanctions more closely than denials accomplishes these goals
without expending judicial resources unnecessarily.
Louis Greco
